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Japan's Defense Buildup, With a Focus on the 1976 NDPO

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Abstract

Japan is always referred to as an "economic great power" and a "military and/or political pygmy." However, Japan began to change the traditional Yoshida Doctrine in the latter 1970s, and after acquiring some major defense equipment in the 1980s it enlarged the range of SDF activity after the Cold War.

Realism argues that the material variables — balance of power (threat) or alliance politics (the fear of abandonment) — were the most important factors for those changes. Constructivism emphasizes the impact of ideational variables — antimilitarism or pacifism — and the hybrid model tries to combine those two kinds of variables.

My argument is that in the second half of the Cold War, the weakening of negative pacifism and the balance of threats decided Japan's defense buildup, and after the Cold War the fear of entrapment and the emergence of positive pacifism became more important. In this article, I will trace the process of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) and try to find the reasons for its establishment. The 1976 NDPO was the first military doctrine in post-war Japan. It became the basis for Japan's security for more than 30 years and will be a critical case for my research.

1. Introduction

Post-World War II, Japan has been called an "economic great power" and a "military and/or political pygmy." After World War II, Japan adopted the so-called "Yoshida Doctrine," which meant reliance on the United States in security affairs and an emphasis on economic development. Japan began to change the traditional Yoshida Doctrine in the second half of the 1970s, and after acquiring some major defense equipment in the 1980s, it enlarged the range of activity of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) after the Cold War.

There are three kinds of studies in current literature about Japan's defense buildup. The first kind of study falls within the philosophical tradition of Realism, which argues that the material variables, such as balance of power (threat) or alliance politics (the fear of abandonment) are the most important factors. The second kind falls within the philosophical tradition of Constructivism, which emphasizes the impact of ideational variables: antimilitarism or pacifism. Finally, the third kind relies on a hybrid model that tries to combine those two kinds of variables.

My argument is that in the second half of the Cold War, the weakening of negative pacifism and the balance of threats decided Japan's defense buildup, and after the Cold War, the fear of entrapment and the emergence of positive pacifism became more important.[1] In this article, I will trace the process of the 1976 Japanese National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) and try to find the reasons for its establishment. The 1976 NDPO was the first military doctrine in post-war Japan. It became the basis of Japan's security for more than 30 years and was discontinued in 2010. In the future, I will complete the research about Japan's defense buildup from the 1976 NDPO to the end of the Cold War.

2. Literature Review

① Material Factors

Realism emphasizes the impact of material factors: balance of power (threat) or alliance politics (the fear of abandonment). Anderson argues that Japan's security production is primarily driven by the regional threat environment and the strength of the U.S. security commitment.[2] From 1969 to 1979, the Soviet threat and U.S. commitment were both low, so that Japan's security production was moderate. From 1979 to 1989, when the Soviet threat was higher and U.S. commitment was stronger, Japan's security production was moderate. After the Cold War, because of increased threats from North Korea and China and weaker U.S. commitment, Japan's security production

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[1] I will explain the concept of negative and positive pacifism later.
[2] Nicholas D. Anderson, "Anarchic Threats and Hegemonic Assurance: Japan's Security Production in the Postwar Era," *International Relations of Asia-Pacific* 17, no. 1, (2017): 101–135.

increased.

　　Lind has discussed the effect of "buck-passing theory" on Japan's security policy. The argument is that Japan would increase its military power and expand its military roles only when the United States failed to respond to growing threats.[3] She argued that when the Soviet Union began to build up its Pacific Fleet and the United States did not focus its military power on East Asia, Japan had to begin its military buildup from the late 1970s to the 1980s. However, as Lind pointed out, this theory showed mixed results in the post-Cold War period. Because the Soviet threat disappeared, the theory predicts that Japan should merely aim at ballistic missile defense capability.

　　Lind's theory is related to another concept: the fear of abandonment. According to some scholars, Japan fears that unless it engages in enough burden-sharing in the common defense of alliance, the United States will abandon it.[4] Even though Yoshida's studies mainly focused on institutionalization of the alliance, which would reduce mutual U.S. and Japanese fears, defense cooperation is one kind of institutionalization and is related to the topic of this article.

② Ideational Factors

　　Constructivists discussed the impact of identity on Japan's security policy. They said that because of Japan's pacifism or anti-militarist identity, it could opt out of *realpolitik*. There are two aspects to this identity: structure and norm.[5] "Structure" means civilian control and a comprehensive definition of security. "Norm" includes social norms like skepticism about military affairs and legal norms like Article 9.

　　Thomas U. Berger also argued that "anti-militarism is one of the most striking features of contemporary Japanese politics and has its roots in collective Japanese memories of the militarist take over in the 1930s and the subsequent disastrous decision to go to war with America," and because of the existence of anti-militarism, Japan would not become a major military power.[6]

③ Hybrid Model

　　Recently, scholars have tended to argue that no single factor can explain Japan's policy.

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[3] Jennifer M. Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy," *International Security* 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 92–121.

[4] Yoshida's theory belongs to the hybrid model, but he raises the argument about the fear of abandonment, so I refer to the following studies by him: Shingo Yoshida, *The Institutionalization of U.S.-Japan Alliance,* Nagoya University Press, 2012; Shingo Yoshida, "Japan's Defense Build-up under the 1976 National Defense Program Outline, 1977-1987: With a Focus on the Defense of Sea Lines of Communication," *The Journal of International Security* 44, no. 3 (December 2016): 35–53.

[5] Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," *International Security* 17, no. 4, (Spring, 1993): 84–118.

[6] Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," *International Security* 17, no. 4, (Spring 1993): 119–150.

Izumigawa contends that pacifism, anti-traditionalism, and the fear of entrapment collectively decided Japan's security policy.[7] Pacifism is not a sufficient condition to constrain Japan's security policy and can perhaps have an effect on the other two variables. Anti-traditionalism can better explain the outcomes, but it is not a necessary condition to constrain Japan's security policy. Finally, the fear of entrapment has the strongest explanatory power. Yoshida thinks that among material factors, alliance politics are the most significant variable, and the antimilitarist identity acts as an "obstruction factor" for SDF's activity.[8] We also can find this kind of argument in studies about analytical eclecticism. For example, Katzenstein and Okawara suggest that we can analyze Japan's security policy using Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism, and combine them so that we can solve several puzzles.[9]

④ The problems of current literature.

First, the balance of power (threat) at least cannot explain the 1990s. Anderson argues that Japan revised its NDPO in 1995, which enabled the SDF to respond to a "situation in the areas around Japan" that was due to the 1993 North Korea Crisis, and after the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and U.S. President Bill Clinton set out "Revised Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation."[10] However, despite the importance of the threat from North Korea, the main reason for changing Japan's security policy was alliance politics: the fear of abandonment. The 1996 US–Japan Joint Declaration on Security was scheduled to be announced at the October 1995 Osaka APEC summit, but it was delayed to 1996 because President Clinton canceled his trip to Osaka. Even though this Declaration came immediately after the Taiwan Strait crisis, that does not mean that Japan decided to revise the guidelines in consideration of the Taiwan Strait incident.[11]

The buck-passing theory cannot tell us why even after Japan decided to expand its military power in the late 1970s, it also showed much self-restraint. The SDF also had very limited freedom of action in the 1980s. as the 1993–1994 North Korea nuclear crisis showed, Japan cannot deploy the SDF outside the Japanese homeland. As Lind herself pointed out, the buck-passing theory showed mixed results in the post-Cold War era.

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[7] Yasuhiro Izumigawa, "Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints of Japan's Security Policy," *International Security* 35, no. 2, (Fall 2010):123–160.
[8] Shingo Yoshida, *The Institutionalization of U.S.-Japan Alliance,* Nagoya University Press, 2012.
[9] Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan, Asia-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism," *International Security* 26, no. 3, (Winter 2001–2002): pp. 153–185.
[10] Anderson, "Anarchic Threats and Hegemonic Assurance," 124.
[11] Yoshihide Soeya, "The China Factor in the U.S.-Japan Alliance: The Myth of a China Threat," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 2, No. 2, (August 2002): 37–66.

The fear of abandonment theory also has problems. In a bipolar system like the Cold War, the secondary state's main role is not to develop military force but to offer military bases to the great power. As Waltz has argued, "[w]here two powers contend, imbalances can be righted only by their internal efforts."[12] It is hard to imagine that the United States would consider abandoning its strategic base (Japan) for East Asia. I will discuss this more concretely in the analytical framework.

Finally, regarding the identity variable, as Hagström and Gustafsson pointed out, studies on Japan's national identity from the constructivist perspective tend to have some problems: "they believe that norms and culture transform very slowly, and have thus predicted little change in Japan's foreign and security policy," and "they argue that change will eventually have to come about as a result of changing structural or material conditions," which made the identity variable as the intervening variable rather than the independent variable.[13] It is not hard to imagine that the slower-changing variable has little power to explain Japan's changing policy. Pacifism is also a multiple concept and variable.

3. Analytical Framework

① The Dependent Variable: Japan's defense buildup.

In international relations theory, one state's defense buildup is always called "internal balancing." However, this concept is vague. For example, Waltz regarded it as amounting to "moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies."[14] However, this definition can integrate every effort states make to become stronger and flourish more. Liff reviewed the literature on balancing and gave us a more complete definition that can be used for empirical studies:

Balancing behavior is (1) restricted to the military domain; (2) a policy response to perceived direct or indirect military threats to a state's security or material interests by another state; and (3) characterized exclusively by efforts to enhance the state's military capabilities to deter or, if deterrence fails, defeat the potential aggressor state in kinetic or non-kinetic military conflict.[15]

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[12] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* Addison–Wesley Pub. Co, 1979, p. 163.
[13] Linus Hagström and Karl Gustafsson, "Japan and Identity Change: Why it Matters in International Relations," *The Pacific Review* 28, no. 1, (2015): 5.
[14] Waltz referred to it as "internal efforts": Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* Addison–Wesley Pub. Co, 1979, p. 118.
[15] Adam P. Liff, "Whither the Balancers? The Case for a Methodological Reset," *Security Studies* 25, no. 3, (2016): 435.

Balancing behavior usually has one goal: deterring the external threat. However, Japan's defense buildup was caused by many factors and was not necessarily meant to deter the immediate external threat (even though in the long term the purpose of defense capability is to deter threats). Nevertheless, the definition and index in balancing literature can also be used to analyze Japan's defense buildup. My definition of Japan's defense buildup has the following components: (1) Japan do the efforts to enhance defense capability; (2) capability means the acquisition of military equipment (*seibi*) and the utilization of that equipment (*unyo*); (3) utilization has two aspects, the enlargement of the SDF's freedom of activity and participation in U.S.–Japan defense cooperation; and (4) restricted to the military domain, economic development is not a part of defense buildup.

Liff offered a very useful index for balancing.[16] However, it was too complicated, and I am not going to discuss all its elements in this article. I have drawn up the following important index:

Low: Setting institutional constraints on SDF's activity, sharp cut in defense budgets, not acquiring major defensive equipment, passivity on alliance defense cooperation.

Moderate: The change of defense doctrine within the current framework, the gradual increase of defense budgets, acquisition of major defensive equipment, limited removal of constraints on SDF's activity, limited alliance defense cooperation.

High: Partly removal of constraints on SDF's activity, the change of defense doctrine toward a new framework, acquisition of limited offensive equipment, active alliance defense cooperation.

Very High: Total removal of constraints on SDF's activity, the change of defense doctrine in new framework, acquisition of large amounts of offensive equipment, acquisition of nuclear weapons, large-scale alliance defense cooperation.

I can then classify Japan's defense buildup as follows:

The second half of the 1970s: Moderate: 1976 NDPO, 1978 Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation, the strengthening of ASW (anti-submarine warfare) and air defense capability.

1980s: Moderate: the strengthening of Maritime and Air SDF, active alliance cooperation.

Firs half of 1990s: Low: negative attitude towards Gulf War (1991) and North Korea nuclear crisis (1993-1994) .

1990s: High: 1995 NDPO, 1997 Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation, 1999 Act Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

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[16] Ibid., p. 436.

② The Independent Variables and Causal Mechanism
(1) International Structure

International structure is one of the most discussed concepts in international relations. There are many kinds of international structures. I will focus on Realism's argument.

There are mainly two kinds of international structure theories in Realism. The first is the balance-of-power theory, and the second is the balance-of-threat theory. Japan was part of the Western Alliance during the Cold War, so the power relations between the Soviet and American camps are important. At the same time, the regional balance between Soviet power in the Far East and its allies, and the U.S. commitment to East Asia and its Asian allies, may be more significant for Japan. Japan is simultaneously concerned about global and regional power relations. At the global level, because Japan relies on the U.S. nuclear commitment, nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union is important for Japan's security. However, I am not going to discuss Japan's nuclear policy much. This article focuses on Japan's development of conventional power. Even though the Government of Japan also considered the possibility of getting nuclear weapons, it has never been an important part of Japan's defense plan. However, this does not mean the global balance of power was not important for Japan. As I will discuss in the case study of the 1980s, there was some discussion in Japan about "Western common defense" and how relying on U.S. nuclear deterrence affected Japan's alliance policy. The local balance of power was more significant. Japan basically regarded its security environment as a local military balance between the U.S. bloc and the Soviet bloc.

There is another theory: balance of threat. Walt argued that aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and aggressiveness of intentions decided the threat degree.[17] Glaser gave us a more sophisticated theory that can be used to conduct empirical studies. In Glaser's theory, power relations, offense-defense balance, offense-defense distinguishability, and the undertesting of an adversary's motives decided the environment that a state faced.[18] Glaser also offered an index about how to manage those variables.[19] I will briefly discuss those variables and index, and I will focus more on Japan's perception.

(2) Alliance Politics: The fear of abandonment

The U.S.–Japan alliance is the basis for Japan's post-war security. Japan always wants to keep a strong U.S. commitment. Discussion about "autonomous defense" does not necessarily means abandoning the U.S.–Japan alliance. I agree with Yoshida that the fear of abandonment is one of the most influential factors in U.S.-Japan relations, but I argue that we should ask when this factor

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[17] Stephen W. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances,* Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 265.
[18] Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation,* Princeton University Press, 2010.
[19]Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and how Can we Measure it?" *International Security* 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 44–82.

can lead Japan to make more efforts on security.

Let us continue to discuss the fear of abandonment and international structure. Morrow offered the theory about asymmetric alliance. In an asymmetric alliance, the major powers offer security for autonomy (military bases), and minor powers offer autonomy or the coordination of foreign and domestic policies for security.[20] The U.S.–Japan alliance is a typical asymmetric alliance. In Japan, the security treaty between the U.S. and Japan is always called the "bases-security exchange model." In this model, the main concern of the United States is the smooth use of bases in Japan, not Japan's security efforts. It is hard to imagine that the United States would abandon Japan – the strategic base for the United States' East Asia policy – just because Japan did not participate in more defense burden-sharing. Snyder argues that in the bipolar system, abandonment is highly unlikely and de-alignment is irrational, but entrapment is possible.[21] However, in a multipolar system, "the fear of being abandoned by one's ally is ever-present."[22] Scholars are not sure what the alliance dilemma is in a unipolar system and whether the post-Cold War period could be called a unipolar system. I will discuss this problem when I investigate the case of 1990s Japan.

(3) Pacifism Identity

"Pacifism" has multiple meanings. I think there are two kinds of pacifism – I call them "negative pacifism" and "positive pacifism" – that have a huge influence on Japan's security policy.[23] Negative pacifism is the belief that Japan should refuse to use "force as a means of settling international disputes" (just like the phrase in Article 9 of Japan's constitution). It stemmed from the miserable experience of World War II. Sometimes it was called "one-country pacifism." This kind of pacifism was very strong in the first half of the Cold War, but from the 1970s, it became "realistic." However, it has never vanished and has set the basic limit for Japan's security policy.

Positive pacifism regards military power as a mean to make an international contribution and help to actively construct the international environment. It is a type of thought similar to the international public goods theory of liberalism. It sprouted Takuya Kubo's theory and began to increase in influence after the Cold War. The Abe administration made it an official policy and called it "Proactive Contributor to Peace." I am not going to analyze this kind of official policy but rather to focus on the academic concept.

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[20] James D. Morrow, "Alliance and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4, (November 1991): 904–933.

[21] Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4, (July 1984): 483–484.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 466.

[23] I borrow this idea from Linus Hagstrom, "The 'abnormal' State: Identity, Norm/Exception and Japan," *European Journal of International Relations* 21, no. 1 (2015): 122–145.

I need to make it clear here that we could not regard pacifism as an independent variable if it did not have the "independent" effect on policy. If in the empirical studies, we found that it was changed by material variables, it just became an intervening variable.

4. The 1976 NDPO

① The Defense Capability in Peace Time

Japan's defense force became stronger after four defense buildup programs, and the defense budget almost doubled every time. With the 1970s oil shock, the left wing became stronger in the Diet. Many voices called for a restriction on Japan's defense force, and politicians, defense agencies, and the SDF could not ignore it. How to legitimize Japan's defense buildup became the major agenda item for the SDF.

As the fourth defense buildup program was underway, Takuya Kubo released an article in January 1971 usually called "KB article I." Many analysts regard this article as a "non-threat theory." In this article, Kubo argued that there was no "probable" threat, but only a possible threat. In view of the Nixon Doctrine, which appealed for allied self-help, Japan was to defend itself at the beginning of conflicts and look forward to the support of the United States, especially U.S. offensive capabilities.[24] Kubo also appealed for Japan's defense budget to be restricted to 1% of Japan's GNP, a balance between military equipment and logistics, and for Japan to expand its defense force when the international environment changed. However, Kubo's theory did not draw much attention at the time.[25]

In the 69th Diet, the debate about "defense force in peacetime" began to be discussed. Prime Minister Kakue Tanaka ordered that this problem be discussed. In January 1973, the Defense Agency offered its proposal: five armies, 13 divisions, and 180,000 personnel for the ground SDF; five districts, four or five escort groups, and 250,000–280,000 tons for the maritime SDF; and three air defense forces, eight air wings, one combined air brigade, and roughly 800 aircraft for the air SDF.[26]

However, the opposition parties protested that this proposal was not a limit, but a "goal" for

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[24] Takuya Kubo, "Way of thinking for defense buildup," February 20, 1971, http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPSC/19710220.O1J.html, accessed on October 23, 2017.

[25] "Taiso Terashima Oral History," in Oral History: Defense Buildup and Alliance Policy in Cold War Ⅳ, National Institute for Defense Studies, 2015, pp. 73–74.

[26] 71th Diet, Budget Committee, No. 3, February 1, 1973, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/071/0380/07102010380003a.html, accessed on October 23, 2017.

the SDF, and they complained that it was not an official government proposal.[27] This proposal was finally retracted.

② KB theory and post-Fourth Defense Buildup Program

In June 1974, Kubo released another article: KB article II.[28] This article was very influential, and the SDF criticized this article because of the "non-threat theory." Kubo thought that there were two functions for the defense force: peacekeeping and deterrence. The idea of peacekeeping began to be popular in Japan after the Cold War, but during the Cold War, we can say that Kubo also did not abandon the traditional deterrence function for the defense force. He just wanted to keep away from the fierce conflicts of the first part of the Cold War. Kubo argued that Japan faced no actual threat, but if Japan's defense force was too small, other countries would be enticed to attack Japan. He also said that Japan should consider the U.S.–Japan alliance and not create a power vacuum in Asia. If Japan lost some military functions, it would give other countries a chance to threaten Japan. Kubo also contended that Japan should expand its ASW and AEW (Airborne Early Warning) capabilities.

Based on Kubo's theory, the Defense Agency began to make the next defense buildup plan. In some early drafts for this post-fourth defense plan, the Defense Agency also showed concern for keeping a military balance.[29] Defense Director Natsume argued that Japan should deal with small-scale aggression and get help from the United States for large-scale aggression, and Japan's defense budgets should be restricted to 1% of GNP. After that, Michita Sakata, the Director General of the Defense Agency, gave his first instruction. It stated that current stabilization of international relations was based on military balance, and Japan should keep the balance of military equipment and logistics, and increase survivability. In October 1975, Sakata released the second instruction that argued that in principle Japan should deal with a small-scale attack on its own.

Those drafts argued that détente was at least based on military balance and considered the domestic opposition to a large-scale defense buildup. In the next section, I will analyze the concrete disputes between those drafts and the SDF.

③ NDPO and SDF

(1) Threat perception and defense buildup.

Even in NDPO, in which the threat was regarded as "limited small-scale," the three SDFs had

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[27] *Yomiuri Shinbun*, February 2, 1973.

[28] Takuya Kubo, Defense Conception and Ideas on Defense Buildup for Japan, in *Takuya Kubo: Posthumous Manuscripts and Memorial Collection*, Takuya Kubo Collection Press, 1982, 58–86.

[29] The drafts to be discussed can be found in *Hoshuyama Related Papers*, 9-8, National Diet Library.

their own ideas about threat and defense buildup. The ground SDF (GSDF) had more affinity with the Kubo theory. Even as Soviet far eastern military power increased dramatically in the 1970s, Soviet ground forces were mainly aimed at China. If Soviet ground forces wanted to invade Japan, the Soviet Union would first need to get an advantage in the sea and air. Even the GSDF had to reduce the potential threat from five to three divisions; it tried to keep the initiative for Japan's homeland defense.[30] In the 1970s, Japan's birth rate was declining, and the GSDF aimed to keep the personnel at 180,000. Sakata wanted to cut it down to 155,000. The GSDF persuaded Sakata and achieved the goal of constructing an armored division and a combined brigade in Shikoku.

The air SDF (ASDF) estimated that 800 Soviet aircraft would attack in the case of a local conflict and 300–400 in a limited small-scale attack.[31] Even the ASDF would reduce the potential threat, many officials did not regard it as "unappropriated."[32] The ASDF wanted to keep the defense force to 14 squadrons and 450 aircraft. However, the Defense Bureau did not agree with that. In the end, it became 13 Squadrons and 430 aircraft.[33]

The maritime SDF (MSDF) deeply feared the Soviet Union. In 1973, Japan suffered from the oil shock. After that, there were many discussions about economic security in Japan. For military security, the loss of gasoline would make the GSDF and the ASDF dysfunctional.[34]

(2) In principle, without external assistance

The ASDF and MSDF wanted U.S. help at the beginning, and they compromised with GSDF about inserting the phrase "in principle," which gave ASDF and MSDF some space. Even though many scholars focused on the autonomous defense factor in NDPO, only the GSDF wanted to deal with small-scale threats without external assistance.[35] It would take the U.S. air force in Okinawa some time to assist Hokkaido; the ASDF also had some ideas about autonomous defense, but they were not as strong as in the GSDF. The MSDF worked with the U.S. for a common training and operation plan even before the 1978 guidelines. The ASDF also did so with the U.S., but not as deeply.

(3) Balance of equipment and logistics/balanced deployment

Ideally, the SDF needed 2% of GNP to complete the buildup of military equipment and logistical systems.[36] The SDF argued that "survivability" – alternate bases, alternate positions,

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[30] "Yasutomo Mitsui Oral History," *Oral History: Defense Buildup and Alliance Policy in the Cold War Ⅳ*, National Institute for Defense Studies, 2015, p. 279.

[31] *Akio Suzuki Oral History*, National Institute for Defense Studies, 2011, pp. 168, 179.

[32] "Shigehiro Mori Oral History," *Oral History: Defense Buildup and Alliance Policy in the Cold War Ⅱ*, National Institute for Defense Studies, 2013, p. 114.

[33] *Suzuki Oral History,* pp. 175–176, 181.

[34] *Mori Oral History*, p. 139.

[35] *Yasutomo Mitsui Oral History*, p. 287.

[36] *Ryoichi Yamada Oral History,* National Institute for Defense Studies, 2009, p. 216.

runway defense, base defense, ammunition reserve, and transportation – would be critical, but at no more than about 1% of GNP, its budget was too small to complete those objectives.

The Defense Agency also asked the SDF to deploy its balanced force in the Japanese homeland. The GSDF accepted this idea, because it wanted to build an armored division and get a new combined brigade, and the idea of balanced deployment could help it to achieve those goals. However, the ASDF did not like this idea, because there were no standards about how to decide on the location of so many bases and how many aircraft every base should have.[37] The MSDF resisted this idea strongly, because the main mission of the MSDF was the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). It was impossible to build many maritime bases with balanced deployment.

(4) Expansion theory

The GSDF can expand its personnel in wartime, and in the 1970s the declining Japanese birthrate meant that the GSDF lacked manpower to expand. However, for the ASDF and MSDF, the number of persons was not important; the critical factor was the quality. For example, it would cost 10 years to train pilots,[38] and Japan could only produce two aircraft per month.[39]

Even though the NDPO considered it necessary to proceed with domestic production and increase the R&D capability, the budget of the related branch was insufficient. Japan abandoned the possibility of the domestic production of P-3C aircraft. Within the 1% GNP limit, it was impossible for Japan to produce large equipment domestically. The limit made it necessary for Japan to cooperate with the United States.

5. Conclusion

In the case of NDPO, even the SDF had some freedom to develop major equipment and deploy it to deal with the external threat; within the 1% GNP limitation, the SDF could not achieve its goal of maintaining the balance of power. The pacifists allowed some space for free action by the SDF, but they imposed the restriction on the SDF. The restriction makes it more important for Japan to cooperate with the United States, but the pressure from the United States and the fear of abandonment were not major factors in the establishment of NDPO.

I examine only one case of Japan's defense buildup. I will examine other cases in the future.

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[37] *Mori Oral History*, pp. 105–108.

[38] *Noboru Hosyuyama Oral History Ⅰ*, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2005, p. 90.

[39] *Suzuki Oral History,* pp. 192–193.